Truckin\u27 in Style along the Avenue: How the Grateful Dead Turned Alternative Business and Legal Strategies Into A Great American Success Story by Drobnik, Brian C.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Spring 2000 Article 8 
2000 
Truckin' in Style along the Avenue: How the Grateful Dead Turned 
Alternative Business and Legal Strategies Into A Great American 
Success Story 
Brian C. Drobnik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brian C. Drobnik, Truckin' in Style along the Avenue: How the Grateful Dead Turned Alternative Business 
and Legal Strategies Into A Great American Success Story, 2 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law 242 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol2/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
art & industry forum
st glance, considering the Grateful
Dead as a subject of legal analysis seems counterintuitive. For anyone possessing even a marginal
understanding of the band's place in American music's history, the very thought should elicit a smile.
Most of the available information concerning the Dead and their 30 years of operations has the char-
acter of children's stories or fairy tales, oral hand-me-downs from people who ate the wrong cake and
took a detour through Wonderland. But for those who have caught a glimpse of the Grateful Dead's
experience, legally oriented suspicions about how the band carried on their business ring familiar.
For one, their practice of allowing their audiences to tape their live performances is commonly known.
There are tapes, still in circulation today, of concerts 10 years older than the Copyright Act of 1976.2
The Dead allowed fans to tape their shows, and even to distribute copies of these sound recordings,
when no one else was 3 (and, incidentally, after the rest of the recording industry had declared war on
bootleggers 4). Instinct-at least a legal instinct-says that this practice is a very bad idea. In reality,
the band's decision to allow tapers was not flirtation with disaster, but an astute business stratagem.
Similarly, the Dead's notion of copyrighting their compositions deviated from what the law seems
to prescribe and what the mainstream recording industry follows. Obtaining a federal copyright
amounted to separate endeavors of writing down the composition and then recording it (assuming one
was both author and first performer) prior to the 1976 Act's implementation in 19785 and then to fix-
ing the work in the tangible medium of a "copy" or "phonorecord" thereafter.6 The band never regard-
ed this regime as merely a ceremonious formality. Still, they routinely played compositions in their
concerts numerous times before ever recording them onto an album for sale, fiddling with arrange-
ments and gauging audience responses for what sounded good. 7 In other words, they in some
instances spent years writing their material.8 This notion does not fit neatly into the spectrum of
American copyright law.
9
And then there is the no-holds-barred attitude with which rock musicians, such as Billy Joel and
the Beatles, appear to enter the courtroom. 10 For a band of the Dead's success and renown, they radi-
ate a belying nonchalance about conforming to
legal ordinances. Though such a conclusion is
a misperception, it appears that on only two
occasions did they find it necessary to litigate
against unauthorized infringers. 11 Simply put,
the Grateful Dead has never fit the stereotype
of musicians being legally aggressive.
That the Grateful Dead were "different"
undoubtedly is true on a broad social level.
But it is not so easy to ascertain how they
were different in the business and legal
aspects of their enterprise. The ephemeral
nature of their approach stems from the fact
that they conducted their affairs within and
alongside the world of statutes and contracts
and yet provided themselves with a great
degree of independence from that world. This
Note will comment on the Dead's perspective
on and their ultimate rejection of many of the
business and legal strategies traditionally
ascribed to in the industry.
After a brief introduction to the ethos of the
Grateful Dead-essential as a frame of refer-
ence into their collective character-this Note










Y BIN C. D RO K
industry practices involved in signing onto a recording
label and getting one's material marketed, distributed,
and sold. It will then examine the law that protects expo-
sure of artists and their work. The reader should keep in
mind that the law views songwriters and recording
artists as separate entities. 12 In practice, this distinction
applies in most instances. This Note, however, will
assume that these parties are one and the same, partly
because the Dead both wrote and recorded their materi-
al, and partly to avoid the inconvenience and redundan-
cy of having to draw out this distinction in passim.
What this Note will not argue is that existing practices
should be altered to favor artists. The system runs the
way it does not so much because large corporate interests
have lobbied it until lopsided, but rather because it works
for the majority of its participants. Still, problems are
common, and the existing structures of the music indus-
try and United States law may be unfit or too inflexible
to address them. What the Grateful Dead did so well
-what this Note will illustrate-was to avoid the pitfalls
inherent in the music business and entertainment law.
They took substantial risks in choosing their particular
course, risks that perhaps only a band of their nature
and with their objectives could possibly embrace. As this
Note explains, their success as performers resulted
directly from their decision to make independence and
artistic freedom a priority. There are currently a handful
of musicians and bands who appear to have taken note of
the Dead's strategy and are profiting greatly by it.
13
Ultimately, this Note will argue that more should follow
suit.
UNCLE JOHN'S BAND14
Grateful Dead concerts were original in our time. To
their following, these events were gatherings, family
reunions, ritual rites of celebration. To outsiders -a vast
majority of the American public-this adoration sounds
like nostalgia for a time and idealism long since passed.
The band was born amidst the communal phenomenon of
San Francisco in the 1960s. But what became the
"Summer of Love" was merely a scene ripe for the
exploitation-minded. Television news cameras arrived
alongside tourists; merchandisers came with their
lawyers; the FBI and organized crime are suspected to
have been involved in the drug scene.15 The Grateful
Dead, generally recognized as the only survivors of the
Haight-Ashberry counterculture, 16 1 7 emerged intact
because they shunned the spotlights and ran their busi-
ness on their terms alone. They left the counterculture
fountainhead at the intersection of Haight and Ashberry
Streets for the road at the end of the Sixties, and stayed
there for another 25 years. 16 During these years, the
band became the most successful touring group in the
industry and attracted a more devoted fan base than any
other rock 'n' roll act in history. 18
The Dead's concerts often resembled a cross between a
carnival and a mass baptism. Mythologist Joseph
Campbell, during his first encounter with the Deadheads
and their leaders,1 9 referred to the fans at the concert as
though they were a congregated tribe, proclaiming:
Now I've seen similar manifestations, but
nothing as innocent as what I saw with this
bunch. This was sheer innocence. And when
the great beam of light would go over the
crowd, you'd see these marvelous young faces
all in utter rapture for five hours! This is a
wonderful, fervent loss of self in the larger self
of a homogenous community. This is what it's
all about!20
This spirit is why the people came to the shows in
ever-increasing numbers for 30 years. This is why they
spent nomadic summers following the band from city to
city, creating an American Odyssey. It explains the tap-
ing of concerts, the maniacal legions of barterers and
archivists capturing for posterity American history as it
occurred. This is why their music was so beloved, and yet
their studio albums invariably mediocre. 2 1 Remarkably,
despite having had only a few of their songs ever receive
radio play (only one of these, "Touch of Grey" off 1987's In
The Dark album, broke the Top Ten), their popularity
remains undiminished five years after the death of
Jerry Garcia. 2 2
The band itself was endowed with awareness that
doing this was their raison d'tre and that it could only be
done by reinventing the rules that corporate America had
made and its musicians followed. As drummer Mickey
Hart explains, "We went on a head-hunting mission for
twenty-five years. We went out there and got this army
in tow. And said, Okay, you guys are something; you're a
thing. And they themselves recognized their own identi-
ty and grew bigger than we ever could imagine. '2 3 In
many ways, every other rock band, as well as every
record label from New York to Los Angeles shares this
quest, for the obvious reason that it translates into rev-
enue. The difference why it worked for one but not for so
many otherslies in their disparate approaches to every-
thing from advertising and marketing to copyright and
trademark control.
Despite the Dead's evident sense of manifest destiny,
little other than their actual playing was left to the
muses.2 4 Rather, they employed deliberate strategies for
attracting and holding a fan base that the industry often
overlooks. 2 5 Their modi operandi, though having the
appearance of disorder and
mismanagement, were actu- The Grateful E
ally well thought-out and
efficiently conducted. 26  deliberate s
They were the paragons of attracting and h
rock 'n' roll debauchery and
self-abuse, and yet they ette I '
worked incessantly.27 And Their modi op
although their musical out-
put was formidable, after having the a
1978's Shakedown Street disorder and n
album they spent little tim e ............. .. . ...... .......
in the studio. 28 It was not were actually
until the 1980s that they and efficient
began filling the larger ven-
ues, despite the fact they They were th
were constantly recycling old rock 'n' roll d(
material.2 9 They rarely pro- self-abuse,
moted new albums, instead
testing their material on the worked ir
road before putting it on
vinyl. 30 For most bands this is an abominable concept
not using an album to promote a tour virtually ensures
poor ticket receipts or, conversely, poor album sales.
3 1
The Dead staged free concerts 3 2 and contributed mate-
rial to or played at benefits in support of everything from
now-fashionable environmental concerns to less desir-
able interests such as the Hells Angels, the Black
Panthers, and San Franciscan prostitutes.3 3 And yet,
despite being linked to characters traversing the perime-
ter of social acceptance, they did not espouse anything in
the way of radical political views. 34 The Grateful Dead
thus never received much in the way of either media or
critical attention. Indeed, they sought to avoid the main-
stream promotional tactics of the music business. They
sold a significant portion of their tickets by mailing them
directly to their fans, thereby avoiding promotion fees.
35
For the remainder that went to promoters and agents,
the Dead demanded that ticket prices be kept reason-
able.3 6 And other than through direct fan newsletters,
they did little to advertise. 3 7 Thus, just as they played on
unnoticed by much of the American public, they remained
elusive and enigmatic to record company executives. In her
social commentary on the Dead, Carol Brightman observed
that, "With a ready-made audience, beholden to Grateful
Dead Productions, there never was much incentive for
the music industry to make collateral investments.
'3 8
The Grateful Dead consistently sought to protect their
community and their fans -
)ead employed
,trategie -r ..











the so-called Grateful Dead
Family-from corporate
America's intrusions, some-
thing that undoubtedly con-
tributed to their swelling
popularity during the 1980s
and 1990s.3 9 But they did
not achieve this through the
implementation of aggres-
sive or exclusive policies. In
fact, if one single element of
the band's character can be
lauded for allowing the "fam-
ily" mystique to flourish, it is
that they and their music
were accessible in ways
other musicians and their
music most often are not.
They welcomed everyone
who would come along for
the ride, and what happened was a phenomenon, a move-
ment, that is 30 years old and counting.
PROBLEMS WITH THE INDUSTRY,
LOOPHOLES IN THE LAW, AND
THE WAY OF THE DEAD
THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS
Dire Straits' most noted song, "Money For Nothing,"40
ironically criticizes the way the music industry radiates
an image of generosity to the artists who are its lifeblood.
It describes the stereotypical guitarist of music video
lore, prancing about the television screen and contorting
over his instrument melodramatically while surrounded
by proof of the good life. The singer (Mark Knopfler)
comments, "Now look at them yo-yo's that's the way you
do it/ You play the guitar on the MTV/ That ain't workin'
that's the way you do it/ Money for nothin' and chicks for
free."'4 1 The song's appeal may lie in that its narrator is
the man who enjoys fame because he plays guitar "on the
MTV," but at the same time is the satirical insider.
The trappings (or rewards, depending on viewpoint) of
musical fame that the song romanticizes most certainly
orbit the power structure of the industry. But they are
not for free. In order even to get four minutes "on the
MTV," one ordinarily must mortgage the very product of
one's creativity early on, and then simply be lucky
enough-or in the rare case, good enough-to get there.
Most of "them yo-yos" are neither.
The Cost of Getting Signed
Most musicians and songwriters begin their careers
with little in the way of notoriety or personal resources.
In the world of record production, this translates into a
need for outside help in everything from recording and
producing one's work to advertising, marketing, and dis-
tribution. 42 More importantly, it also means that the
songwriter or musician has little bargaining power, other
than the quality of his or her work, which, until it sells in
packaged format, remains unproven. 4 3  Thus, even
though the songwriter may own first copyright to the
material by virtue of being its author,4 4 the publisher
(which is often a subsidiary of a larger production corpo-
ration) usually obtains this ownership by assignment.
4 5
The reason behind this transfer is obvious: the publisher
is the entity responsible for taking the work from its cre-
ative stages to its commercial end-goal, a process that
requires a high degree of control over how the composi-
tion or recording is to be used and marketed. 4 6 But pub-
lishers can wield their expertise-based bargaining supe-
riority to gain control over rights for creating derivative
works, 47 publicity rights and biographical information,
48
editing and revision rights,4 9 and even the assignment of
third party songwriters to rewrite or retool the original
composition.
50
This power of publishers can be problematic for the
songwriter because it leaves her with little control over
what is done with her material and sometimes leads to
later conflict. For a songwriter who carries an emotional
attachment to her work, the fact that a publishing com-
pany may alter the work's arrangement or content to bet-
ter exploit it is at the very least unseemly. Moreover,
should the artist eventually build a successful name for
herself in the recording business, protection of earlier
material may take on an even deeper importance than
initially felt.
Often, this situation will give rise to royalty disputes
as well.5 1 If a new artist contracts with a publisher for
its services, he will normally receive only a minimal roy-
alty percentage. 52 Thus, if the work happens to sell well,
the publisher and production companies enjoy a percent-
age of the profits that arguably would go to the artist had
he operated independently. This situation becomes fur-
ther aggravated when the publisher or producer
advances monies to the artist on the condition that they
be credited against future royalties, or compensated by
even greater ownership control over the artist's work.
5 3
Future litigation over ownership rights and use of the
songwriter's material is virtually impossible since pub-
lishers tend to reserve in the original contract the right
to settle "in the manner [they] alone determine to be in
the best interest" of all parties involved. 54 The cor-
porate partner, therefore, can easily dispose of law-
suits, a practice that undoubtedly has prevented the law
from evolving in the direction of protecting musical
artists from unfair exploitation.
The songwriter can avoid the drawback of a publishing
agreement by self-publishing. This is what the Grateful
Dead did. They maintained ownership of the publishing
rights to every song they wrote, even before the estab-
lishment of their in-house publishing company, Ice Nine
Publishing.5 5 Of course, one must remain mindful of the
uniqueness of their situation. Most songwriters sell the
publishing rights to their compositions because they are
not also recording artists; they require someone to record
and perform their songs if they are to earn a living in the
music business. The Dead, however, played both roles. 56
Thus, the band did not depend upon other performers to
supply them with income from performance royalties.
Conversely, they did not have to distribute any of
their earnings to publishing companies since general-
ly they refused to employ songwriters outside their
own organization. 5 7
Because the Grateful Dead began as, and remained, an
act whose success resulted from the strength of its live per-
formances, their concern for studio success was always sec-
ondary.58 Thus, they could write dozens of songs and play
them for years before they made their way onto a studio
album. 5 9 Long-time manager of the Dead, Rock Scully,
comments:
The Grateful Dead manner of writing
songs is a very haphazard, hit-or-miss
business. Nothing is nailed down. First
THE DEAD HAND
It is through litigation details that many of the underhanded business practices of the music industry have come to light. The legal
issues and lawsuits that artists and their estates become involved in can have as much impact on the music we hear as do the musi-
cians with whom the artists work or even the songs they choose to record. Often, lawsuit begets lawsuit in an ever-deepening pool of
claims. STAN SOOCHER, THEY FOUGHT THE LAW: ROCK Music GOES To COURT (1999).
[I]mportant... was the symbiosis that developed between the band and its audience-a reciprocity likely unequaled in pop history. At
the heart of this connection was the Dead themselves and their self-built business organization....This model of an autonomous coop-
erative helped spawn what was perhaps the largest genuine alternative communion in all of rock: a sprawling coalition of fans, entre-
preneurs, and homegrown media that surrounded the band, and that promoted the group as the center for a worldwide com-
munity of idealists-and that community thrived largely without the involve-
ment or support of the established music industry or music press.
JOHN PARELES, NIGHT BAT A SHADOw HISTORY OF
ROCK & ROLL 374 (1998).
tid -
0e they tion tac-
try their songs out in tics paid off;
front of an audience. For most
groups the song gets written and
arranged, then it comes out on record and
gets played on the radio. Only then does
the band go out on the road and back up
the record, basically lip-synching their
own songs. The Dead, however, like to go
out onstage and play a totally new song-
something that they've just written or are
still writing-long before it ever appears
on an album.
60
For the Dead, choosing what to release on their studio
albums was a simple matter; they knew what their fol-
lowers appreciated, having already exposed them to the
unreleased material. Amazingly, some of their most
beloved and well-known songs were released only on live
albums, while still others never made it off the stage.
Ultimately, the Grateful Dead obtained a high level of
artistic integrity by claiming the freedom to determine
what they played live and, to a lesser degree, what they
recorded. Quite simply, the band wanted no one else to
have control over their work or their musical direction.
6 1
The Dead were the first band to sign with a major label
(Warner Brothers) with the condition that all publishing
rights be kept within their own organization. 6 2 Though
the battles over this issue were furious, 63 the band even-
tually prevailed. Unlike artists desperate to break into
the business, the Grateful Dead did not care for record-
ing an album if this would mean assigning away artistic
control and copyright to their music. 64 The band's nego-
not only did they
receive a larger cut of their
albums' sales revenue by maintaining publishing rights,
but their stubbornness also resulted indirectly in raising
overall royalty percentages for recording artists.
6 5
Contrary to industry philosophy, the risks they took did
not result in failed careers.
Recording and Producing An Album
The recording artist, as opposed to the songwriter,
must contend with an entirely different set of demands.
The initial success of an album will depend largely upon
the amount of exposure it receives. 6 6 Because recording
companies only can do so much to advertise a new artist's
work, radio play is an essential component (if not the pri-
mary method) in ensuring that consumers will become
aware of the music. 6 7 This reality determines not only
which songs will end up being recorded onto an album,
but also the number of songs that will be included, their
arrangement in relation to each other, and their length
and style.68
Peter Muller, in THE Music BUSINESS-A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE, writes that A&R executives:
6 9
[T]end to listen for a sound that has a wide
appeal, that will remain fresh album after
album, and that possesses a distinctive yet rec-
ognizable quality. The winning combination
often represents a commercially successful
artist/record company relationship that is
highly profitable for all parties connected with
the artist and the record company.70
This description is a romanticized summary of what
actually happens during an album's song selection and
production phases. Because radio audiences of popular
music typically do not possess either great patience or a
remarkable attention span, production departments nec-
essarily select singles that are catchy in sound and whose
playing length falls between three and five minutes.
7 1
The royalty payment system simply reinforces this
design as overall sales depend heavily upon positive air-
play.7 2 Because the recording company will normally
advance production costs to the artist on the condition
that they be subtracted from the artist's royalty cuts in
the album, recording executives reserve the final author-
ity over what is put on an album. 7 3 This can mean that
longer, and often more serious, compositions that an
artist desires to record, but that are not considered com-
mercially attractive, will struggle to make it onto an
album.74 In sum, the artist's decisions and endeavors are to
an alarming degree the properties of her business partner.
75
Touring is also a crucial support feature to promoting
an album. 76 For the new artist not experiencing ade-
quate airplay, opening for a more well known act or trav-
eling with a high profile concert festival (H.O.R.D.E.,
Further, Lollapalooza, among others7 7) can mean expo-
sure to large audiences. 78 But when the tour is designed
as a revenue engine to ride the crest of momentum cre-
ated by radio play, musicians find themselves stuck in a
particularly strange Catch-22. Though they may wish to
demonstrate the breadth of their repertoires and talents,
musicians are confronted with the reality that most con-
cert goers pay inflated ticket prices to hear live exactly
what they have been hearing on their favorite radio sta-
tions (or on the full-length album being promoted by
the concert).
79
Another aspect to touring that threatens artistic
independence is product promotions.8 0 When a product
manufacturer agrees with a recording company to spon-
sor one of its artist's tours, that artist not only becomes
associated with the manufacturer and its product, but
also may have contractual obligations -created by record-
ing executives-to sponsor the manufacturer in return.
8 1
Record companies also typically reserve the exclusive
right to market their artist' publicity interests.8 2 This
control means that record companies effectively dictate
the nature of the artists' promotional enterprises
beyond touring.
83
Of course, the Dead were first and foremost a live
band. Until 1987's studio effort In the Dark, they neither
pursued seriously nor achieved recording an album that
was commercially successful by industry standards.
8 4
Although the Dead may have been better off releasing
live performances, it was difficult to convince Warner
Brothers to do so. Rock Scully, longtime friend and man-
ager to the band, remarked:
The stigma against live recordings is entirely a
record company thing, and needless to say it
comes down to the scaly business of money.
Since the songs in live concerts are usually
rerecordings of material for the most part
already on studio albums, there isn't a new set
of songs to scoop the publishing gravy off of.
And because it doesn't go through the normal
channels, the producers and A&R guys don't
get a cut either.
85
The Dead were masters at cutting out the middlemen
that artists encounter in the music business.8 6 However,
they did not experience the same financial pressures that
most other artists-especially those with a marginal live
performance reputation-face in this situation. When
the need arose, they could simply take to the road and
generate massive revenue.8 7 During the band's contract
with Warner Brothers, they did not possess "industry
clout" of the same manner or to nearly the same degree
as many of their contemporaries, such as the Rolling
Stones. So perhaps Warner allowed the group the
amount of license they did because they understood that
Grateful Dead albums would never sell in tremendous
numbers, and that therefore the Warner Brothers label
would not sacrifice a great deal of money by giving the
band the control it wanted.
Whatever the case, Scully claims that the Dead man-
aged to raise royalty rates for recording artists general-
ly.88 Because the Dead had a tendency (especially in con-
cert) to play extended jams in the middle of their songs,
or to segue one song to the next via lengthy improvisa-
tional experimentation, they stood to receive lesser roy-
alties for only recording two or three songs per album
side. The answer to their problem came from the jazz
world, where longer improvisational pieces are far more
common. For years, jazz musicians' royalties were com-
puted by the minute, not per song. The Dead took heed
and convinced Warner Brothers to agree.8 9
For most of the Grateful Dead's career, touring was
their primary source of income. 9 0 What is remarkable is
the fact that they did not advertise their arrival to a par-
ticular city, or at least in the normal fashion. They began
their playing career as the house band for Ken Kesey's
infamous acid test parties in La Honda and San
Francisco. 9 1 For these gigs and similar ones in the Bay
area, they usually distributed posters. 92 When they
went on the road, they worked at obtaining local fan
bases by self-promotion absent a large advertisement
budget. 93 They received substantial airplay on late-
night FM radio shows, which at the time was still a fledg-
ling medium.9 4 The night-time FM audience, partially
comprised of college students who had come of age dur-
ing the late '60s and who harbored many of that era's
sentiments, were the Dead's targets. When the band
would play the several East Coast venues it frequented
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they often would stage
numerous free concerts at local college campuses or city
parks. 95 In 1970, for instance, the band played around
70 shows on the East Coast.9 6 Scully remarks on how
the Dead managed to play a number of these concerts for
free as a promotional strategy, writing, "Warner Brothers
didn't know how to promote the band in earlier years.
We convinced them to finance a series of free concerts in
seven cities. They paid for the flatbed trucks and the
sound system and we did the rest."'9 7 The organizational
cost of this promotional strategy was marginal compared
to a real concert promoted in the ordinary manner-
there were no middleman promoter fees, advertisement
amounted to announcing the free show the night before
at a real gig, and permits were easy to come by.
9 8
Though both Warner Brothers and the band may have
lost money by not charging admission, the Dead began to
build a reputation of eschewing the greed that already
had permeated the counterculture music scene.
People were drawn to them because of their apparent
values, and then, for the most part, kept coming back for
the music. Of particular significance is the length of an
average Grateful Dead show. At the time (and still
today), most artists would play for no longer than two
hours, having written a performance limitation into their
contracts with local promoters. 9 9 But the Dead insisted
that they be given at least four hours of stage time (many
of their shows extended well beyond five hours in
length).1 0 0 Furthermore, when major concert tour ticket
prices began to skyrocket, the band refused to allow pro-
moters to charge more than $30 a ticket.101
Their concerns over delivering quality are no better
illustrated than in how they treated their road crews and
managers, and their commitment to developing state-of-
the-art sound equipment. Whereas most bands hire
independent crews for each tour, the Grateful Dead kept
their employees on the payroll year-round. 10 2 During the
height of the band's success, crewmembers earned six-
figure salaries, were entitled to profit sharing, health
benefit and retirement plans, and even were provided
backstage daycare for their families. 10 3 The loyalty that
such treatment inspired undoubtedly resulted in high
performance by their crew. But it may have been the
Dead's legendary "Wall of Sound" that set the quality of
their concerts apart from those of their competitors.
1 0 4
The Dead were notorious for their fascination with tech-
nology. In response to the acoustic problems presented
by playing larger outdoor venues and drafty indoor sport-
ing arenas, the band's personnel developed the Wall of
Sound system (later mimicked by other bands), a config-
uration which could deliver their loudest jams or Garcia's
most subtle notes to anyone in the audience.
10 5
The band's unorthodox "communal" approach-unique
in the industry-made for good business sense. 106 Mikal
Gilmore documented the results of this philosophy some
20 years after the Dead formed:
The Grateful Dead and their audience function
-and thrive almost entirely outside the con-
ventions of the mainstream pop world.
Consequently, the Dead-a band rooted in the
ferment and romanticism of the 1960s-some-
how epitomize the two most prominently con-
tradictory ideals of 1980s pop culture: they are
not just a raging cult fave but also a smashing
mass success. 10
7
To call the Grateful Dead a "mass success" may obscure
what it is they accomplished. They were not successful
with a large audience so much as they were extremely
successful with a particular core audience. As Sam Hill
and Glenn Rifkin note in RADICAL MARKETING, "By never
going mainstream, [the Dead] earned larger sales and
profits than many groups that went big-time." 108  In
other words, they did not saturate the airwaves, enter
licensing contracts with large merchandisers, or engage
in overpriced, low quality tours. Instead, the Dead cre-
ated a strong relationship with a particular audience,
and provided a product cheaply enough and of high
enough quality to inspire reliance-and ultimately
unheard of devotion-from that audience. 10 9
Career Development in the Image and Likeness of Success
If an upcoming artist exhibits signs of potential com-
mercial success, record companies will be eager to sign
that artist to a long-term recording contract. Such an
arrangement is attractive to both parties, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. The artist receives long-term financial
security in the form of corporate patronage, and in many
cases is ensured the prestige and publicity value of being
signed to a major label. 110 Conversely, the record com-
pany binds a predicted moneymaker for a certain number
of albums. Furthermore, the record company will have
the opportunity to exploit that artist's growing populari-
ty and even mold the musician's image and product in
response to market trends. 11 1 A primary concern, at
least for the recording artist, is the royalty percentages
paid on later albums: success should yield higher per-
centages, improving on the "minimum wage" cuts nor-
mally offered for a young act's first album. A sliding roy-
more than 14 million copies worldwide. 11 7 Faith was the
most popular album in the United States that year,
establishing Michael as a commercial and musical force
in the most important pop culture market. 118 That same
year, Sony purchased CBS in what was part of a global
consolidation trend in the music industry.119 Many in
the business were concerned that the concentration of the
recording industry into a handful of mega-labels would
homogenize the industry and sterilize it of variety. 120
Michael apparently detested the teen image of Wham!
and worried that his solo efforts would never receive seri-
ous consideration. 1 2 1 Beginning with Faith, and contin-
uing with 1990's release, Listen Without Prejudice Vol. 1,
Michael initiated an artistic metamorphosis. 12 2 But he
became convinced that Sony had sabotaged his efforts to
tap American audiences with Listen Without Prejudice
alty scale therefore is nor-
mally provided in the con-
tract, which is fair to both
parties since it rewards each
partner's efforts. 
11 2
Nevertheless, artists pay for
the recording of their albums
out of their future royalty
earnings, in effect selling
future bonds in their uncre-
ated work. 113 A group whose
music is not embraced by the
public may simply end up in
perpetual debt to its label
while still under an exclu-
sive contract. 114
Sam Hill and Glenn Rif/Ji¢
comment that, "As ective
f h ies [the .....
Dead] owned the marketing
function themselves.,,They never
"-handed it off to a
publicity firm or pushed it
down into layers of a
bureaucratic organization."
Vol. I (whose style and con-
tent broke sharply from that
of 14 million seller Faith) in
apparent retaliation for his
refusal to appear in promo-
tional videos for the album.
Thus, Michael sought
release from his recording
contract. 123 Claiming that
his recording contract consti-
tuted an unreasonable
restraint on trade, 1 24 he
filed suit in England, where
the law was more sympa-
thetic to his profession. 12 5
He lost the suit and then set-
Even for artists who are enormously successful, the
pressure to maintain their level of success can put them
at the mercy of a prominent label. The winning formula
initially struck by an artist and a recording company
often fades as time passes. In other words, the sound
that caused one album to sell may not be well-received
album after album. Nor may it represent the artist's
evolving concept of what his or her identity should be. An
exclusive contract arrangement can make it difficult to
escape this quandary.
The highly publicized litigation brought by George
Michael against Sony illustrates the predicament of long
term exclusive contracts. 115 In 1984, Michael signed
with CBS Records' British affiliate when he was a mem-
ber of the teen-pop duo Wham!1 16 Four years later, his
first solo effort for CBS, an album entitled Faith, sold
tled with Sony after indicating his intention to appeal the
case. 12 6 Michael's concerns, as unabashedly economic as
they were artistically noble, are not uncommon for
recording artists and songwriters. His litigation had two
far-reaching results in the industry: it showed every
artist rooting for Michael how costly such moves would
be, and it effectively warned recording labels to be more
careful in how they contracted with their talent.1 27
The Grateful Dead's initial recording contract with
Warner Brothers was successful by all accounts.
Nevertheless, friction existed from the start, 12 8 and their
fundamental differences about how to succeed in the
music business eventually led the band to seek alterna-
tive production and distribution channels. 129 They ful-
filled their initial recording contract's obligations in
November, 1972, with the release of Europe '72, an album
comprised mostly of live recordings from their European
tour of the preceding spring and summer.130 Since the
album contained many songs that they had been playing
but had not released on vinyl, it technically constituted
"new" material, fulfilling their contract. 1 31 The following
spring, the band launched their own recording company,
Grateful Dead Records, and a satellite company called
Round Records for producing individual band members'
solo projects. 1 32 The notion to start up independent
record labels had its genesis in the difficulty the band
experienced in working with producers, studio techni-
cians, and executives. 133 Though this project yielded
some of their more memorable material, it folded after
several albums.1 34 One can only imagine the pressures
self-management imposed upon a group of people who
were diametrically opposed to getting up for work in the
morning.'
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Their later recording contract was with Arista. It mir-
rored the contract they had entered into with Warner
Brothers, but was more relaxed in its demands. This
flexibility may have been the result of several factors.
For one, the band focused not so much on the production
of new material, but instead on touring and solo projects.
It would seem that Arista acknowledged that pushing
industry norms upon the Dead simply would stifle the
production process for everyone involved. The recording
executives recognized the band's incredible drawing
power, with or without new releases. In turn, the Dead
understood the benefits of having some structure
imposed upon them from an established organization in
the industry. In effect, this loose imposition allowed
them the breathing room to pursue many of the concepts
surrounding independent promotion and distribution
channels that they had envisioned while under contract
with Warner Brothers, but were unable to develop on
their own. 136
The band incorporated in 1973, the same year they
launched Grateful Dead Productions and Round Records
(which in itself was a radical decision for the time).
13 7
Each band member became a CEO and obtained a seat
on their board of directors, owning an equal share in prof-
its and an equal vote in all decisions. 1 38 Sam Hill and
Glenn Rifkin comment that, "As collective CEOs of the
business, [the Dead] owned the marketing function
themselves. They never handed it off to a publicity firm
or pushed it down into layers of a bureaucratic organiza-
tion."13 9 In order to ensure that the band would contin-
ue to enjoy the benefits of artistic freedom and total con-
trol over its business direction and decisions, the Dead
agreed that upon the death of any member, that person's
shares would be reabsorbed by the organization and
redistributed among the remaining CEOs. 140 This pre-
science has paid dividends in recent years, as Grateful
Dead Productions conducts all licensing negotiations for
Jerry Garcia's estate, 14 1 while ex-wives and acquain-
tances have emerged from the woodwork to feud over his
personal estate.
14 2
The Dead began this entire process of "own(ing) the
marketing function themselves" in 1971, when the band
inserted a notice in its Grateful Dead album, signed by
Garcia and reading "DEAD FREAKS UNITE: Who are
you? Where are you? How are you? Send us your name
and address and we'll keep you informed." 143 What fol-
lowed were thousands of responses, leading later that
year to the publication of a fan newsletter providing
information on tour dates and requesting feedback about
various quality concerns. 14 4 In essence, the band adopt-
ed database marketing long before mainstream mar-
keters took notice of this technique.1 4 5 They further
tapped the willingness of their fans to communicate
directly with them by incorporating a promotion booth
into their 1974 tour.14 6 In the last 25 years, this grass
roots style of self-promotion has blossomed into an enor-
mous merchandising and distribution system, one that
currently generates more than $60 million a year.147
THE ENIGMA OF OWNERSHIP AND
PROTECTING ONE'S PUBLICITY
The law supplies artists with an extensive arsenal
designed to prevent others from profiting from their
labor. Through federal trademark and copyright laws, as
well as an array of state common law doctrines, artists
may attempt to secure royalties from the use of their
work and maintain a high degree of control over how
record companies market both their product and their
image. Their concern is legitimate, especially in a socie-
ty such as ours. But since many artists relinquish both
publishing rights and copyright control over their work
during its production stages, 148 the legal safeguards
whose purpose it is to "protect" actually do more to pro-
tect legal ownership than artistic origin. Little sympathy
exists either in the corporate music arena or in the court-
room for the many songwriters and musicians who seek
to salvage their rights from corporate exploitation.
In recent years, several high profile artists have suc-
cessfully sued to reclaim rights they had previously
signed away. In addition, artists (or their estates) have
pushed forward state common law claims and remedies
to obtain more comprehensive protection for themselves.
Nevertheless, the problem remains that this area of the
law traditionally has responded more favorably to the
economic realities of the business. Thus, even when
artists do obtain the industry clout to secure control over
their material, reliance on legal remedies to do so often
means that they will use these remedies as instruments
for excluding other artists and fans from incorporating
the material into their own work. 149 It is a vicious circle
once entered, and in the end artistic integrity amounts to
an amorphous legal term at best.
Because the Grateful Dead's primary focus always has
been artistic integrity, they necessarily have avoided
adopting such a policy of legal exclusion. They well
understood that their success was intricately linked to
their accessibility. As bassist Phil Lesh has remarked,
"The relationship between the band and the Deadheads
needs to be nurtured because they are us and we are
them."15 0 This is not to say that the Dead allowed others
to trample their efforts; they vigorously enforced what
policies they did erect. But even in their enforcement of
policy, they adopted a philosophy of inclusion, something
to the effect that the more people they had working for
the propagation of their product, the more powerful a
marketing mechanism they had at their fingertips. They
simply required that others not take advantage of their
generosity. In return, they never pushed the exploitation
of themselves to the point where it became the exploita-
tion of their audiences.
Intellectual property law in the United States pur-
ports to maintain a balance between the interests of
authors and those of the public. Necessarily, this objec-
tive implies that there is a barrier between the two. But
since intellectual property is by its nature intangible
property, the legal barriers defining its parameters are
shifty at best.1 5 1 The Grateful Dead's philosophy was to
eliminate many of these barriers, or at least to minimize
their intrusiveness into the relationship the band shared
with its fans. They accomplished this by first maintain-
ing control over their legal rights in their property, and
then by allowing near-complete access to it for those who
wanted access. Although this decision ran contrary to
the dogma materializing in the industry during the
Dead's formative years, it made the band one of the most
successful-and enigmatic-the business has seen.
Trademark Dilution Theory and the Lanham Act
Trademark law has two primary functions. The first is
to protect the legal owner of a product or an idea from
unfair competition in her efforts at marketing and selling
the product or idea. 15 2 Its second function is to minimize
consumer confusion. 15 3 Consumers frequently associate
goods and services with certain symbols and words, often
to the point where the trademark itself will serve as a
primary quality assurance. 1 54 Trademark enforcement
thus protects both the seller's economic advantage and
her reputation, plus the buyer's reliance that he in fact is
getting what he pays for. Although the traditional stan-
dard for trademark infringement is the "likelihood of con-
fusion" analysis developed by the Second Circuit in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Electronics Corp., 15 5 courts
have extended this area of the law. For example, in
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., the Fifth Circuit prohibited unauthorized trademark
uses that created the illusion of endorsement or sponsorship.'
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But, though seller and consumer protection is an
important policy concern, fears that courts are unwilling
to limit trademark law's scope are well founded.
15 7
Obviously, the greater control trademark law affords
existing sellers over their markets' diversification, the
harder it becomes for the sellers of new goods or services
to gain entry into these markets. But these concerns
tend to reflect trademark law's focus on market arenas
for highly competitive products and services, where the
function of a good of generic origin substitutes easily for
that of a name brand commodity. Furthermore, trade-
mark law and its critics often have failed to look beyond
a market's immediate bottom line.
The Lanham Act, 158 designed to codify common law
trademark doctrine (which, unlike patent and copyright
law, has no explicit anchor in the United States
Constitution1 59), became a prominent judicial tool for
expanding trademark's reach. 160 Section 43(a) of the
statute forbids any "false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which...
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic ori-
gin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities."' 16 1 Courts have interpreted this
prohibition to protect against infringement of trade-
marks both registered 16 2 and unregistered, 16 3 patently
false advertisement, 16 4 and even misleading statements
that create false impressions. 1 65 Section 43(a) is thus a
flexible weapon in defending one's economic or business
interests. Unfortunately, because strength of a plaintiff's
trademark is the touchstone for determining whether
infringement may have occurred, § 43(a) works far better
for the established and the successful. 166
Illustrative of this point is a recent case involving a
musician's claim of false advertisement. In Waits v.
Frito-Lay Inc., singer-songwriter Tom Waits sued the
makers of SalsaRio Doritos tortilla chips for both misap-
propriation of his voice and for "false endorsement under
the Lanham Act." 16 7 After the Ninth Circuit found that
the quality of one's voice can




determined that Waits had
standing to sue under § 43(a)
because the "interest assert-
ed . . . [was] a commercial
interest protected by the
Lanham Act."'1 69 The court
declared, "Standing... does
not require 'actual competi-
tion' in the traditional sense;
it extends to a purported
endorser who has an eco-
nomic interest akin to that of
a trademark holder in control-
ling the commercial exploita-
tion of his or her identity."
170
The difficulty with the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in
favor of Waits is that the
opinion applies traditional
trademark principles (the cou
his career, shunned commercial self-exploitation through
product endorsement. Since his claim did not neatly fit
into existing categories of tort law concerning damage to
reputation, the Ninth Circuit read the Lanham Act
broadly. The court hinted at the possibility that damage
to Waits' reputation as an artist of high integrity and lofty,
anti-establishment ideals could have translated into loss of
future revenue by offending loyal fans. 1
74
There certainly is merit to this rationale and to
extending the Lanham
The curious aspect to thDead's trademarks hat
they n ever ha"evoked
or their music.
Images such as the "Dancing
Bears" the "Skull and Roses".
or "Steal Your Face,1" have
come to identify the fans
just as much as the band, and,
ultimately, the ethos surrounding
both. The Dead came to
understand the value inherent
in these images, and that it
derived first from their music.
rt invokes many of the
same infringement factors listed in Polaroid Corp.) 17 1 in
a situation where there is no competition between plain-
tiff's and defendant's products, direct or otherwise. The
Ninth Circuit discusses two reasons for its holding. The
first is obvious: it simply would be inequitable for a sell-
er of a product to profit by associating a celebrity's iden-
tity with that product without consent. 1 72 But the court
adds that Waits has an interest in not being injured com-
mercially.17 3 What the Ninth Circuit meant by this,
since the opinion readily admits the absence of formal
economic competition, is that Waits' commercial integrity
as an artist stood to suffer. Tom Waits was really bring-
ing suit-under the guise of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act-
for injury to his reputation as an artist who, throughout
Act's coverage to such claims
where it is likely (in this
case, actual) that consumers
will mistakenly assume
sponsorship by a celebri-
ty.17 5 But, even though the
Ninth Circuit decided this
case correctly, it is nonethe-
less problematic. Under the
Ninth Circuit's substitution-
al analysis, courts may have
difficulty distinguishing
between meritorious claims
and ones that are frivolous
or belligerent. An artist
could use this blind spot to
block the development of
alternative products. Such a
prediction is not immediate-
ly evident when the litiga-
tion is between an artist and
a food manufacturer. But
substitute another musician
for Frito-Lay, and estab-
lished artists or corporate producers in the music indus-
try have an effective means of stifling artistic develop-
ments that seek to incorporate aspects of other artists'
identity or material. 1 76 Recent legislation and litigation
in the area of digital sampling illustrates the depth of
this concern.1 77
Roughly three months prior to the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 17 8 the same court decided
a case involving the teen group, "The New Kids On The
Block."17 9  The musical act brought ten trademark
claims against the newspaper USA TODAY and THE STAR
MAGAZINE. 1 8 0 The essence of these claims revolved
around the fact that both publications had posted 900
number telephone hotlines whereby readers could partic-
ipate in polls. 18 1 The group insisted that USA TODAY and
THE EVOLUTION OF GROOVE
Consider the blues song "In the Pines," a traditional whose modern arrangement is attributed to Huddie Ledbetter (a.k.a., Lead Belly).1
The song has been performed and recorded for decades by various artists whom Lead Belly has inspired, ranging from bluegrass to
punk rock musicians. But when one listens to Nirvana's rendition 2 after hearing Lead Belly sing it, one realizes how songs mutate over
time through the performances and interpretations of later artists drawing inspiration from the original recording. For the teenager who
follows the angst-driven, hard-played sounds of early '90s grunge rock-an audience with probably little awareness or interest in early
blues artists-Nirvana's recording actually may introduce them to an entirely new world of music. What they will find is a genre that
quite frankly perfected guitar incantations of anger, sorrow, and isolation long before Kurt Cobain was born.
I LEAD BELLY, "In the Pines," on Where Did You Sleep Last Night? (TRO-Folkways
Music, Inc., BMI, 1996).
2 Id. perf'd. by NIRVANA on MTV: UNPLUGGED IN NEW
YORK (Geffen Records, Inc., 1994).
THE
STAR MAGAZINE were capitaliz-
ing on their popularity by associating their
publications with The New Kids' trademarked
name and by drawing young fans to the 900 number polls
(and thus away from the group's own 900 number infor-
mation hotline).182 The Ninth Circuit found that neither
publication was liable under the Act since the 900 num-
ber constituted a fair use 18 3 and consumer confusion was
highly unlikely. 8 4 Although the court held that the pub-
lications did not create consumer confusion to the result
of usurping The New Kids' potential fan revenues, the
case raises several questions. The combined monetary
intake for both polls was $1,900, $300 of which USA
TODAY donated to the Berklee College of Music.
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Furthermore, the polls, rather than robbing The New
Kids of crucial income, indirectly heightened the group's
exposure, and consequently their publicity value. Why,
then, did the plaintiffs seek legal redress for something
that actually may have served their ends, expending the
resources necessary to push the litigation into the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit?
The answer to this question may lie in the theory
behind trademark dilution doctrine. 186 Consider The
New Kids' fears in terms set forth in Allied Maintenance
Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades. Inc. 18 7 In this case, a
New York court said dilution is not "public confusion
caused by similar products or services sold by competi-
tors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or
services which feeds upon the business reputation of an
established distinctive trade-mark (sic) or name. ' 188 In
an industry where publishing and production conglomer-
ates normally own the rights to phonorecords, sound
recordings and musical compositions, an artist's reputa-




modity he possesses in
the long run.189
Trademark manipulation is therefore
central to preventing others from siphoning off a musi-
cian's source of revenue. Thus, for artists, and for tri-
bunals adjudicating these claims on a case-by-case basis,
doctrines such as tarnishment and blurring are instru-
mental in protecting the artists' long term economic posi-
tions.19 0 But it may be that these doctrines are detri-
mental to artists' interests, both economic and artistic
ones.1 91 When trademarks are incorporated into subse-
quent creative designs, the level of secondary meaning
they take on further enriches the primary meaning
assigned to them at their inception. 19 2 Moreover, this
process often attracts consumer attention to the original
work that otherwise may have channeled itself to other,
more recent and more visible substitutes.
19 3
The Grateful Dead understood this concept. Though
various organizations seeking sponsorship or access to
their fan databases often approached the band, the Dead
were not a marketable sponsor in the same way most
celebrities are. For one, their audience has never been a
mainstream segment of the American populace, nor a
coveted group of consumers. Furthermore, the band
probably has had far too many associations with drug use
or political subversiveness to appeal to corporate
America. However, if ever there has been a rock group
ripe for trademark infringement, they are it. No other
band has been surrounded by such a wealth of trade-
marked images. And no other band's trademarks have
the ability to summon such an array of metaphors.
The curious aspect to the Dead's trademarks is that
they never have evoked just the band or their music.
During the band's formative years, when they resided at
710 Ashberry Street in San Francisco, local poster artists
created a small array of imagery playing off of the band's
name. 19 4 But instead of these early ciphers merely serv-
ing to announce an upcoming concert, fans of the group
found that, by placing them in windows of houses or
cars, they could identify each other. 195 They became the
banners of an emerging community. Thus, what began
as a confined group of symbols would later spawn a dis-
tinct genre of imagery that shaped the lexicon of thou-
sands. Images such as the "Dancing Bears," the "Skull
and Roses," or "Steal Your Face," have come to identify
the fans just as much as the band, and ultimately, the
ethos surrounding both. The band did establish trade-
mark protection over these designs, though originally
they had wanted all credit to be given to the graphic
artists. 196 But they came to understand the value inherent
in these images, and that it derived first from their music.
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The level of protection that the Dead traditionally has
exerted over their trademarked images, however, differs
greatly from standard trademark principle. Anyone
familiar with a Grateful Dead concert has seen the spec-
tacle that existed outside the venues they played. A vir-
tual carnival of merchants, magicians, and acrobats
would congregate in fields and parking lots, selling
homemade T-shirts, stickers, and other items bearing the
band's many logos. For years, the group paid little atten-
tion or concern to this subculture. After all, it indirectly
supported them. 19 8 After realizing that they were "los-
ing" over a quarter of a million dollars a show in licens-
ing revenue, however, the band decided to take action.
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But instead of excluding these merchants from producing
band-oriented items-instead of suing them for trade-
mark infringement, tarnishment or dilution-the
Grateful Dead made such entrepreneurs licensing offers
which in effect brought them into the band's fold.
Ultimately, this decision resulted in further garnering
fan respect. It also dispelled possible worries that the
Grateful Dead were "selling out" to financial temptations
(plus, they avoided a substantial amount in potential
legal fees). 20 0 Despite how apparent the fan reaction
became, the music industry and critics of the band sim-
ply dismissed it as a nostalgic attachment to '60s idealism.
Copyright Protection: Too Little, Or Too Much?
Copyright law in the United States borrows primarily
from an economic cost-benefit analysis in assessing what
protection to give intellectual property. It balances the
more immediate economic potential the author should
enjoy from his work, made possible through protective
policy, and the long-term social benefits produced by
public access to his work after he has had an appro-
priate opportunity to exploit it.201 The Register of
Copyrights announced:
The enactment of copyright legislation by
Congress under the terms of the Constitution is
not based upon any natural right that the
author has in his writings . . .but upon the
ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will
be promoted by securing to authors for limited
periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
20 2
The result of this philosophy has been that copyright law
conceives of the creative process-and thus its scope of
protection-in terms of economic realization whose bene-
ficiary is determined by the passage of time.
Moreover, copyright law tends to view creation or com-
position as a singular moment or an isolated process,
whose result is a static representation of the completed
process, fixed in a "tangible medium."20 3 This notion of
artistic creation ignores a musical artist's interest in
sound recordings2 04 and live renditions or performanc-
es, 20 5 as well as her interest in having others interpret
her work through performance.20 6 It also confines the
notion of style to the composition or original
phonorecording. 20 7 But for many performers, style is
often the genius of the musician. After all, would Elvis
Aaron Presley's songs have been the music of Elvis with-
out pelvis gyrations and sequined capes and jumpsuits?
The Grateful Dead-whose musical roots lay in tradi-
tional American blues, R&B, folk, and bluegrass music-
understood this concept. Their focus was thus always
centered upon the evolution of what they played. Of
course, they copyrighted every song they wrote, and they
paid royalties for covers. But the fact remains that a
song the Dead first wrote and played in 1968-"Saint
Stephen," for example-had become a much different
composition by the late '70s (furthermore, some of the
songs they covered did not resemble their original rendi-
tions in the least, Noah Lewis' "Viola Lee Blues" for
example 20 8). Copyright law entertains this possibility by
granting protection for revisions and subsequent reinter-
pretations of one's work. 2 09 But the Dead's manner of
revision was to improvise before a live audience. This
automatically threatens problems with the Copyright
Act's fixation requirement. The Dead may have pre-
empted any such problems by recording their own con-
certs (though this was done, at least in their early years,
for posterity's sake).
Nevertheless, audience members taped their shows
from the start, and, until recently, copyright law has had
little to say about bootleggers. 2 10 But while other artists
sought to sue bootleggers out of business under causes
such as unfair competition, 2 11 the Dead began to wel-
come them. Understanding that their bootleg albums
were commanding a price on the market, the Dead
opened their doors to every bootlegger who wanted to
tape them, provided only that the tapes be bartered for
other tapes. 2 12 Sam Hill and Glenn Rifkin comment that
"those with the most extensive tape collections became
masters of their universe, and thus the open-taping deci-
sion fueled ticket sales." 2 13 More than this, by flooding
the market with their live product, the Dead eliminated
the market in which for-profit bootleggers thrived.
Furthermore, such an extension of trust magnified fan
devotion, while the presence of countless bootlegs on the
market created greater demand for touring.
The Grateful Dead's creed has always been, "When we
are done with the music, [the fans] can have it."' 2 14 The
extreme of this philosophy was the fact that the Dead
often broadcast their concerts. Contrary to popular
industry wisdom, the Dead customarily sent their live
shows over empty airwaves. On any given night, audi-
ences ranging in size from the people in the parking lot
who could not get tickets to 20 million northern
Europeans could hear what they were not able to see.
2 15
The band's inclusion of their entire audience into the his-
tory of their performances, through both their taping pol-
icy and live broadcasting, merely amused the music
industry. Ironically, the Dead's perspective on copyright
law and bootlegging-which to an extent neglected
both-has been adopted by other artists who have wit-
nessed the success of their strategy.21 6 They have
begun to adopt it.
The States Play Catch-Up: Alternative Remedies, The
Right of Publicity, and the Legacy of Elvis
Copyright law has always been highly protective of the
more traditional economic aspects and results of artistic
creativity, but indifferent to traditionally ignored aspects
such as voice and public identity. In response, many
states have developed alternative remedies through com-
mon law doctrine and legislation to patch Congressional
gaps and oversights.
2 17
The right of publicity first was recognized in a court-
room in 1953.218 Another 24 years passed until the
Supreme Court considered any claim under it.219 After
Elvis Presley died a pauper in 1977, his estate sought to
recapture the impressive merchandising revenue his
name commanded but which had been scattered among
various private entrepreneurs through financial mis-
management during his lifetime.2 20 His estate did much
to advance the common law in the realm of publicity
rights, culminating in a successful lobbying effort that
prompted the Tennessee Legislature to pass The
Personal Rights Protection Act in 1984. The statute pro-
vides that the right of publicity is descendible. 22 1 But
critics have accused Presley's estate of being too aggres-
sive in its quest to control its merchandising opera-
tions.2 22 Two cases in particular illustrate the plausibil-
ity of this criticism.
In Estate of Presley v. Russen,2 23 the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey entertained
a suit for, among other things, 22 4 infringement on the
right of publicity that the estate had inherited from
Presley.22 5 After Presley's death, the number of Elvis
tribute shows increased more than tenfold, from 300 to
over 3,000 nationwide.2 2 6 The defendant Russen was a
promoter of an Elvis impersonator (one Larry Seth) who
would dress like Presley and sing covers of Elvis' songs in
imitation of his style.2 2 7 The performance toured prima-
rily in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania, selling
memorabilia and records that depicted the imperson-
ator's visage (a close resemblance to the King at the
height of performing career).2 2 8 Worried by the growth
of the Elvis-impersonation business, the estate targeted
Russen's operation (which grossed around $300,00 in
1978229) with an negative injunction against continued
performance as the self-titled "Big El Show."2 30 The court
presented the right of publicity issue in these terms:
In essence, we confront the question of
whether the use of the likeness of a famous
deceased entertainer in a performance mainly
designed to imitate that famous entertainer's
own past stage performances is to be consid-
ered primarily as a commercial appropriation
by the imitator or show's producer of the
famous entertainer's likeness or as a valuable
contribution of information or culture. 2 3 1
The district court found that the defendant's use of
Presley's image was almost explicitly for his own finan-
cial benefit, potentially "appropriat[ing]" and "dimin-
ish[ing]" the commercial rewards that are under the legal
auspice of Elvis' estate.
2 32
The Presley Estate's fears and the district court's par-
allel findings are entirely justified-3,000 plus Elvis
impersonation shows a year 2 3 3 would represent a sub-
stantial amount of concert attendance revenue. But the
court was uneasy with the notion that this revenue nec-
essarily would have returned to the estate if not for the
imitators. 23 4 After all, Elvis had left the building for
good four years prior; he was no longer competing for con-
cert goers. The district court granted a preliminary
injunction. But it added that, absent a showing of actu-
al economic harm to Presley's heirs by Russen's promo-
tion, the Big El Show would be allowed to continue.
23 5
This result, perhaps in part a reaction to the Presley
Estate's aggressive attempts to run an independent pro-
moter out of business (the Big El Show was the single
source of income for both
Russen and Seth)2 35 , indi-
cates that the court held
deeper reservations about
elevating New Jersey's right
of publicity to such a stature.
Lurking throughout the
opinion is the awareness
that, despite the Presley
Estate's interest in control-
ling the use of its personality
rights in Elvis, there was no
actual competition between
it and Russen's enterprise.
23 6
If anything, the Big El
Show was merely part of the
larger cultural phenomenon
surrounding Elvis' legend.
And it is entirely likely that the widespread existence of
Elvis impersonators has simply added to that myth,
attracting even more attention to the deceased artist
from members of his own generation and subsequent
ones.2 3 8 By seeking to isolate the Elvis personality from
the general public through protectionist measures, it is
possible that the singer's heirs threatened to cut off the
very lifeblood that supported the passion for the deceased
star. It is also possible that the estate's increased rev-
enue has resulted as much from the propagation of
Presley's myth as from the their reclamation of merchan-
dising revenue via publicity rights litigation.
Similarly, in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v.
Capece, 23 9 the Fifth Circuit decided a lawsuit against the
owner of a Houston nightclub called "The Velvet Elvis."
The Velvet Elvis was a concept bar whose decor reflected
the tawdry self-indulgence sometimes associated with
the 1970s. 240 Soon after deciding to relocate the estab-
lishment in 1994, the club's owner, Barry Capece,
received a cease and desist letter from the Presley
Estate.2 4 1 Capece ignored the threat and the Presley
estate sued two years later.2 4 2 In considering the plain-
tiff's claims (unfair competition, trademark infringement
and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act; infringe-
ment of its right of publicity under Texas law24 3), the dis-
trict court found that the Velvet Elvis did nothing to
damage or infringe upon the estate's interests.
2 4 4
Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, 2 45 the court declared that the night-
club's use of Elvis' name and likeness amounted to noth-
ing more than parody or
"societal commentary,"
which has the beneficial
function of recoding social
metaphors into new con-
texts.2 4 6  This principle
remains the foundation of
intellectual property law.24 7
The court found no likeli-
hood of consumer confusion
as to the purpose of the par-
ody, or as to endorsement or
sponsorship by the Presley
Estate. 24 8  The prevailing
analyses of both trademark
dilution and infringement of
the right of publicity com-
pare a plaintiff's and a
defendant's products and imagery to each other.
Accordingly, the court made quick work of the Presley
Estate's claims under these analyses. It observed that
the name "the Velvet Elvis" and the display of various
Presley memorabilia served not so much to attract cus-
tomers via name and likeness appropriation, but rather
to recreate the atmosphere of an era in American histo-
ry.24 9 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's rulings. It found that Capece's use of
Presley's name and likeness both competed unfairly with
the financial and publicity interests of the estate, and
that it constituted trademark infringement. 2
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It is remarkable that the Presley Estate decided to
By flooding the market W-rtheir live product, theead
.eli 'ntdteet in which
/ for-profit bootleggers thrived.
Such an extension oft'rust
magnified fan ,devotion,
while the presence of
countless bootlegs on
the market created greater
demand for touring.
take legal action against Capece. As in Estate of Presley
v. Russen, 2 51 it is unlikely that the Velvet Elvis directly
competed with the estate's interests, and, even if so, that
it harmed the estate financially. And as in Russen, it is
probable that the attention the nightclub brought to
Elvis' name would have translated into merchandising
revenue for the Estate.
Though the Dead certainly have not overlooked their
publicity interests, their stance is as relaxed and open as
it is in regard to copyright and trademark control. Again,
they function within the paradox of being in control of
their affairs, and yet allowing outsiders to determine to a
great degree the course of these. The band members
have allowed their pictures to grace everything from T-
shirts to ice cream. Aside from negotiating a licensing
agreement and retaining rights to quality approval, they
have allowed their fans to conduct the bulk of their pub-
licity work. Currently, they have begun appointing
trustees to assume control over their stock, but with the
notion being "business as usual. ' 25 2 The band plans to
open an interactive museum in San Francisco during
2000 that will reconstruct various elements of their con-
cert experience, provide a research facility for studying
grass roots and world music, display live acts, and provide
public access to their business and legal files. 2 5 3 Unlike
Graceland-essentially a tourist attraction-the Dead's
vision includes everyone in their continuing enterprise.
DEAD-ON
The Grateful Dead were a record company executive's
nightmare. Though they followed few rules traditionally
relied upon by artists in the music business, the vision
they had of alternative strategies proved to be incredibly
successful. By maintaining control over each element of
their business, they were able to offer a superior product
at a lower cost. Additionally, by erecting fewer legal bar-
riers between themselves and their audience, they fos-
tered a long-term relationship with their customers.
Perhaps the greatest irony about their success is that
they appeared to so many as the antithesis of what they
really were: tremendous musicians, unique entertainers,
astute and legal savvy business people. Most of America
took little heed of these middle-aged hippies who seemed
to keep coming around. But recently, other artists have
begun to.2 5 4 What they have realized is that, of all peo-
ple, The Grateful Dead were redefining the business as it
was defining itself. *
The author would like to thank Gretchen Victoria for the idea,
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